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THE EFFECTS OF AIRLINE STRIKES ON STRUCK AND 
NONSTRUCK CARRIERS 
RICHARD A. DE FUSCO and SCOTT M. FUESS, JR.* 
This  study provides new evidence on the  industrywide impact of 
strikes by investigating how strikes have affected the  values of  struck a n d  
nonstruck airlines. Using stock market data  fo r  the  years 1963-86, the  
authors  show that  most strikes adversely affected the  value of  struck 
airlines' stock bu t  enhanced the  stock value of  nonstruck carriers. The 
results also show that strikes before October 1978, which marked t h e  
e n d  of  strict regulation of the  industry and  of  the  employers' mutual aid 
pact, h a d  some  effects different f rom those of  strikes after that  date.  
A N important conclusion of recent studies using stock market data to 
estimate the impact of unions on firms is 
that strikes have reduced the share value 
of struck firms. One question not yet 
answered, however, is whether strikes 
redistribute wealth within an industry. If 
one firm is selected for a strike while 
competing rivals remain in operation, the 
rivals may receive higher output prices 
and increase production. Thus, an effec- 
* Richard DeFusco is Assistant Professor of Fi- 
nance and Scott Fuess is Assistant Professor of 
Economics, both at the University of Nebraska, 
Lincoln. The authors thank James Fain, Gordon 
Karels, Martin Milkman, W. B. Nelson, Robert 
Sauer, and Thomas Zorn for helpful comments on 
earlier drafts of this paper, and Atiya Ahsan and 
Bongdae Choi for research assistance. 
The authors also thank Jerrold Glass of the 
Airline Industrial Relations Conference. 1920 N 
tive strike targeted at one firm may reduce 
the value of that firm while increasing the 
value of nonstruck rivals. 
T o  see if nonstruck rivals have bene- 
fited at the exDense of struck firms. in this 
study we use stock market data covering 
the years 1963-86 to estimate the effects 
of airline strikes. The airline industrv is 
especially well suited for an analysis of the 
intraindustry effects of strikes. Unions 
have selected individual airlines for 
strikes, leaving the remaining carriers free 
to operate. Because air travel cannot be 
~roduced  in advance or stored in inven- 
tory, a strike of one airline may allow 
other carriers to benefit. 
The Intraindustry Effects of Strikes 
In a recent study, Carter, Hueth, 
Mamer, and Schmitz (CHMS) (1987) ob- 
, . 
Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20036, for providing served that a strike may not remove 
the data on airline strikes, and Marion Mistrik of the enough output to impose losses on pro- 
Air Transport Association of America, 1709 New 
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an effective strike must inflict hardship on 
producers. Fuess (1990) showed that the 
effectiveness of strikes against individual 
firms in an industry depends on employ- 
ers' inability to cooperate in resisting 
strikes. If a struck firm receives side 
payments from nonstruck rivals, then an 
effective strike must remove enough out- 
put from the targeted firm to reduce 
industry profit. If there are no side 
payments, then an effective strike need 
only reduce the struck firm's profit. 
To estimate the economic costs of 
strikes, researchers have used stock mar- 
ket data and the event study methodology 
developed in financial economics. They 
have found not only that strikes reduce 
the value of struck firms, but also that the 
stock market has partially anticipated 
strikes.' Although Becker and Olson 
(1986) found that strikes resulted in lower 
share values for struck firms, they noted 
(p.  433) that their study did not show how 
strikes affected nonstruck firms.2 Event 
study analysis, however, has been used to 
investigate the intraindustry impact of 
other firm-specific events. This approach 
has been taken to examine the effects of 
bank failures (Aharony and Swary 1983), 
automobile recalls (Jarrell and Peltzman 
1985; Hoffer, Pruitt, and Riley 1988), and 
airline crashes (Borenstein and Zimmer- 
man 1988; Chalk 1986, 1989; Karels 
1989). 
The airline industry provides a unique 
opportunity to estimate the intraindustry 
effects of strikes, since some strikes in that 
industry have hampered the operations of 
struck airlines while merely inducing 
nonstruck carriers to adjust their flight 
schedules. As media accounts of the recent 
Eastern Airlines strike indicate, other 
Among those studying the effects of strikes on 
equity share values are Becker and Olson (1986), 
Davidson, Worrell, and Garrison (1988), Greer, 
Martin, and Reusser (1980), Linneman and Spiller 
(1983), Neumann (1980), and Tracy (1988). 
Neumann and Reder (1984) reported that strikes 
have not affected industrywide production in U.S. 
manufacturing. They noted (p. 210) that this finding 
may reflect output reductions on the part of struck 
firms, with simultaneous output expansions by 
nonstruck firms. 
carriers have apparently increased fares 
and carried more passengers in response 
to the developments at E a ~ t e r n . ~  In addi- 
tion, since the deregulation of the industry 
in 1978 there has been a dramatic change 
in the operating and labor relations 
environments of airlines. This circum- 
stance presents the chance to test whether 
the effects of strikes changed when the 
industry's environment changed. 
Estimating the Intraindustry Effects 
of Airline Strikes 
Data and Sample Periods 
T o  analyze the stock market effects of 
strikes, we first gathered a sample of 
airline strikes. The  strike data were ob- 
tained from the Airline Industrial Rela- 
tions Conference (AIRCon) in the April 
1987 report entitled "Strikes Under the 
Railway Labor Act, 1946-1986." This 
report lists the airlines and unions in- 
volved in strikes, as well as the beginning 
and ending dates of strikes. A copy of the 
same report was also provided by the Air 
Transport Association of America. T o  be 
included in our strike sample, the com- 
mon stock of the struck airline had to be 
listed on the New York or  American stock 
exchange and also had to have daily stock 
returns available on the University of 
Chicago's Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) daily returns file. Because 
daily data are available from CRSP only 
since July 2, 1962, our strike sample is 
restricted to 1963-86. 
Labor relations for airlines are gov- 
erned by the Railway Labor Act. Airlines 
operated in two distinct environments 
over the 1963-86 period. Prior to October 
1978 the industry was heavily regulated. 
The Airline Deregulation Act, enacted on 
October 24, 1978, freed airlines to adjust 
domestic fares and routes. Deregulation 
also affected the airline industrial relations 
en~ i ronment .~  Specifically, there was a 
Articles by iomani  (1989) and Valente (1989) 
are among those supporting this point; also see U.S. 
Neys and World Report (1  989). 
For surveys and reviews of airline labor rela- 
tions-including discussions of  various effects of 
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dramatic change in the ability of non- 
struck carriers to make side payments to 
struck airlines. From 1958 through 1978, 
some airlines participated in a mutual aid 
pact (MAP), which provided transfers 
from nonstruck to struck carriers. During 
the later years of the pact, 1962-78, struck 
airlines received 25%-50% of their nor- 
mal air transport operating expenses 
through MAP funding. Enactment of the 
deregulation legislation effectively elimi- 
nated the pact.5 
Given the different operating and labor 
relations environments, we partition the 
strike sample into the mutual aid-regula- 
tion period, January 1963-October 1978, 
and the non-mutual aid-deregulation pe- 
riod, October 1978-December 1986. For 
each period we examine the performance 
of a "struck" portfolio and a "nonstruck" 
portfolio. Over the 1963-78 period there 
were 31 strike events at MAP member 
airlines for which stock market data are 
available. The "struck" portfolio thus 
contains 3 1 observations. For each strike 
in this period, the "nonstruck" portfolio 
contains nonstruck MAP members. There 
are 209 observations in the "nonstruck" 
portfolio. Pact membership information is 
taken from Unterberger and Koziara 
(1980). 
During the non-mutual aid-deregula- 
tion period, there were 12 strike events at 
listed airlines that had belonged to MAP. 
For this period the "nonstruck" portfolio 
contains nonstruck airlines that had be- 
longed to MAP. Two strike events in this 
deregulation on collective bargaining-see Cappelli 
(1987), Curtin (1986), Hendricks, Feuille, and Sz- 
erszen (1980), Kahn (1980), Northrup (1971, 1983), 
and Thornicroft (1989), as well as the collections of 
papers edited by McKelvey (1988) and Rehmus 
(1977). A sizable literature has emerged on the 
various effects of airline deregulation. Among those 
presenting reviews and citations are Bailey, Graham, 
and Kaplan (1985) and Moore (1986). 
On the airlines' mutual aid pact-including 
discussions of the airlines participating in the pact, 
descriptions of how funds were paid into the pact 
and paid out during strikes, and lists of the dollar 
amounts transferred from nonstruck to struck 
airlines-see Cappelli (1987). Kahn (1980), Northrup 
(1977). and Unterberger and Koziara (1975, 1977, 
1980). 
period are associated with Continental's 
1983 bankruptcy, imposition of wage and 
work rule changes, and reorganization.6 
The strikes were called off in 1985. when 
the union members returned to work 
without settlements. Altogether, the air- 
line was struck for a ~ e r i o d  of 765 davs. 1 I 
T o  prevent Continental's unprecedented 
strike-bankruptcy episode from contami- 
nating our results, we exclude Continen- 
tal's strikes of 1983-85 from the "struck" 
portfolio for the 1978-86 period. The 
Continental case is analyzed separately. 
An essential reauirement of conven- 
tional event study kethodology is "clean" 
event windows. Because we examine strike 
events over long intervals, it is important 
to exclude overlapping events. Our con- 
struction of the "nonstruck" portfolio thus 
excludes airlines experiencing overlap- 
ping strikes. T o  be more specific, if airline 
A is struck on day 0, then this event is 
included in the "struck" ~ortfolio. We I 
then construct intervals beginning 60 days 
prior to the strike announcement and 
ending 30 days after settlement. If, during 
A's strike interval, airline B experiences a 
strike, then an overlapping strike has 
occurred, and airline B is excluded from 
the "nonstruck" portfolio for the event 
period of airline A's strike. Similarly, the 
strike of airline B is included as an event 
in the "struck" portfolio and airline A is 
excluded from the "nonstruck" portfolio 
for that strike event.' 
Event Study Methodology 
T o  estimate the effects of strikes on 
struck and nonstruck airlines, we use stock 
market data to construct a measure of 
firm performance. Stock market data 
Among those discussing and recounting Conti- 
nental's bankruptcy and strikes are Cappelli (1987) 
and Curtin (1986). 
'AS noted above, recent studies have examined 
the impact of plane crashes on airlines' share values. 
This research indicates that an airline experiences a 
reduction in share value following the occurrence of 
a crash. Thus, our construction of portfolios ex- 
cludes airlines experiencing crashes during strike 
events. Information on crashes, including dates and 
airlines involved, can be found in Borenstein and 
Zimmerman (1988). 
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allow an estimation of the normal, or  
expected, return to security i on day t, 
E(R,), in the absence of the event. The  
abnormal, or unexpected, return to the 
security, AR,, is the difference between its 
observed return, R,, and its expected 
return: AR,, = R, - E(R,). 
The research hypotheses in this study 
are tested by employing the event study 
methodology described in Dodd and 
Warner (1983) and Brown and Warner 
(1985). A strike announcement date is 
denoted by t = 0 and a strike settlement 
date is denoted by t = SETTLE. Daily 
abnormal stock returns are estimated for 
each security over the interval t = - 60 to 
t = SETTLE + 30. 
For a sample- of N events, the daily 
average (portfolio) abnormal return for 
each day t, AR,, is computed by 
(1) AR, = 
N 
(1/N) [R,, - ai - biRmtlt 
i =  l 
t = - 6 0 t o t  = SETTLE + 30, 
where R,, is the return to security i on day 
t, and R,, is the return for the CRSP 
equally weighted market index on day t. 
The coefficients ai and bi are estimated 
from the market model regression Rit = ai 
+ b,R,, + e, over the interval t = - 180 to 
t -81. 
T o  examine the intraindustry effects of 
strikes, we analyze the abnormal perfor- 
mance of the "struck" and "nonstruck" 
airline portfolios. If the effect of an event 
is distributed over time or if an event is 
partially anticipated, then the daily portfo- 
lio abnormal return may not accurately 
reflect the economic i m ~ a c t  of the event. 
1 
Airline strikes may be anticipated because 
the Railway Labor Act specifies a cooling 
off period of 30 days after the failure of 
mediation to achieve a settlement before a 
strike can begin. Consequently, we mea- 
sure the cumulative impact of the strike 
with an average cumulative abnormal 
- 
return. 
An average cumulative abnormal re- 
turn, CAR (TI, T2), can be computed by 
summing the AR,'s over various intervals (t 
= TI to t = T,). T o  isolate the "announce- 
ment" effects of strikes. we examine the 
portfolios' abnormal returns on the days 
immediately before and after the begin- 
ning of the strike. T o  examine the 
longer-term impact of strikes we examine 
the cumulative abnormal performance of 
the "struck" and "nonstruck" portfolios, 
starting as much as 60 days prior to the 
strike announcement and ending as much 
as 30 days after the strike's settlement. 
The expected value of AR, and CAR (TI, 
T,) is zero in the absence of abnormal 
performance. The statistical significance 
of average abnormal returns and average 
cumulative abnormal returns is based on 
the average standardized abnormal re- 
turn, ASAR,, and the average standardized 
cumulative abnormal return, ASCART,, T2. 
The standardized returns and standard 
normal Z-test statistics used in this study 
are presented in Chalk (1986) and Dodd 
and Warner (1983). 
The Effects of Strikes on Airlines' 
Share Returns 
We hypothesize that the effects of airline 
strikes occurring between January 1963 and 
October 1978 differed from the effects of 
airline strikes occurring after October 1978. 
During the earlier period, we expect that 
strikes had some adverse effect on the share 
returns of struck carriers, but an effect that 
was ameliorated by the presence of mutual 
aid and the regulation of routes. Also, since 
mutual aid payments were not explicitly 
linked to any windfall benefits experienced 
by nonstruck carriers, but were tied to the 
normal operating expenses of the struck 
airlines, nonstruck carriers might have ex- 
perienced a positive share price reaction. 
During the later period, we hypothesize 
that airline strikes had much sharper 
effects on the share returns of struck 
carriers. because airlines' routes and fares 
were not regulated and there was no 
mutual strike aid. Without mutual aid and 
with deregulation making it easier than 
before for rival carriers to adjust routes 
and fares, we expect that an effective 
strike of an airline during the later period 
resulted in a negative market reaction for 
that airline and a positive market reaction 
for the nonstruck carriers. 
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Strike settlements mav also affect air- 
linksf share values. T o  the extent that the 
suspension of aid payments, new contract 
terms, and any lost demand affect struck 
airlines, settlements may result in negative 
abnormal returns for those airlines and pos- 
itive abnormal returns for nonstruck car- 
riers. If, as suggested by Tracy (1988:4), 
strikes are a "learning mechanism" and set- 
tlements convey new information about the 
o u t ~ u t  demand faced bv firms. then settle- 
' 
ments may result in positive abnormal re- 
turns. Finally, strike settlements may be 
seen bv nonstruck airlines as a   review of 
~ - ~ , I 
their own upcoming bargaining agree- 
ments. This last point may be important in 
the context of this study, because the 1978- 
86 period partly corresponds to a period of 
cost-cutting and concession bargaining in 
the airline i n d u ~ t r y . ~  
The  Effects of Strikes on Struck and 
Nonstmck Airlines: 197%86 
Our empirical analysis begins with an 
examination of the effects of airline strikes 
in the non-mutual aid-deregulation pe- 
riod. Ten strike events are analyzed. As 
panel A of Table 1 shows, the announce- 
ment of a strike resulted in a significant 
" 
negative cumulative abnormal return for 
the "struck" portfolio. For the intervals 
immediately surrounding a strike an- 
nouncement, ( -  1, 0) and ( -  1, l), the 
struck airlines experienced a negative 
CAR ranging from 2.66% to 3.14%. For 
the "nonstruck" portfolio, containing 121 
observations, the announcement of a 
strike resulted in a significant positive 
cumulative abnormal return. For the 
intervals (-2, O), ( -  1, O), and (-3, 2), the 
positive CAR ranged from 0.12% to 
1.74% (see Table 1, panel B). 
Because airline strikes may be partially 
anticipated, we examine cumulative ab- 
normal returns for both the 30-day and 
'On the stock market effects of concession 
bargaining, see Becker (1987) and Becker and Olson 
(1987). On concession bargaining in the airline 
industry, see Cappelli (1987) and Thornicroft 
(1989); also see the collection of essays edited by 
McKelvey (1 988). 
Table 1. Strikes and  Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns: T h e  Effects of  Strikes of  Major Air 
Carriers on a Portfolio of  Struck Airlines and  
a Portfolio o f  Nonstruck Airlines, October 
1978-December 1986. 
Z- Value 
(Absolute 
Mean (%) Value) 
A: Portfolio of Struck Air Carriers: 
Strike Announcement Effects ( n  = 10) 
CAR( - 1,O) - 2.66 2.33** 
CAR( - 2,O) -0.61 0.43 
CAR(0,l) - 1.75 1.53 
CAR(- 1,l) -3.14 2.24** 
CAR( - 3,2) 0.70 0.35 
B: Pdfol io  of Nonstnuk Carriers: 
Strike Announcemat Effects (n = 121) 
CAR( - I ,0) 0.12 1.68* 
CAR( - 2,O) 1.74 4.52** 
CAR(0,l) -0.13 0.60 
CAR(- l , l )  0.0 1 1 .OO 
CAR( - 3,2) 0.9 1 2.1 1** 
C: Portfolio of Struck Air Carriers: 
S t d e  Interual Effects ( n  = 10) 
CAR(- 30, - 1) 2.08 0.45 
CAR(-60,- 1) - 6.76 1.52 
CAR(-  SETTLE- 1) 4.26 0.53 
CAR(SETTLE,SETTLE + 30) 0.83 0.35 
CAR(- ~ O , S ~ L E  + 30) 5.09 0.14 
D: Portfolio of Nonstruck Carriers: 
Strike Interual Effects (n  = 121) 
CAR(-30,- 1) - 0.34 0.35 
CAR(-60,- 1) 1.29 1.22 
CAR(- ~O,SETTLE - 1) -2.18 1.80* 
CAR(SETTLE,SETTLE + 30) 5.3 1 4.40** 
CAR(- ~O,SETTLE + 30) 3.13 1.51 
"Day 0, the strike start date, and SETTLE, the 
settlement date, are reported by AIRCon in the April 
1987 report "Strikes Under the Railway Labor Act, 
19461986." The data on share returns were 
obtained from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices, University of Chicago. 
* Significant at the .I0 level; ** at the .05 level. 
60-day intervals, CAR(- SO, - 1) and 
CAR(-60, - I), preceding a strike an- 
nouncement. As indicated in panels C and 
D of Table 1, there is no evidence of 
significant CARS for these intervals during 
the 1978-86 period.9 
In their analysis of the effects of airline 
deregulation, Michel and Shaked (1984) reported 
that during the years of sharply higher oil prices, 
1978-80, over long intervals almost all airlines 
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Table 2 .  Continental's Strikes and Bankruptcy, 1983-1985: Selected Daily Abnormal Returns. 
Datea Event 
Aug. 11, 1983 
Aug. 15, 1983 
Sept. 14, 1983 
Sept. 23, 1983 
Sept. 26, 1983 
Oct. 3. 1983 
June 20, 1984 
Apr. 17, 1985 
Sevt. 16. 1985 
Daily Abnormal 
~ e t u r n ~  
Airline threatens to hire strike-breakers if machinists (IAM) strike 
Trading day after machinists strike 
Airline offers workers 35% stake in company in exchange 
for $150 million in concessions 
Trading day before bankruptcy action 
Trading day after bankruptcy action 
Trading day after flight attendants (UFA) and pilots 
(ALPA) strike 
Bankruptcy action upheld in court 
Machinists and flight attendants return to work without settlements 
Pilots return to work without settlement 
-- 
" Dates represent the stock market trading days associated with the events. Starting and ending dates of 
strikes are reported by AIRCon in the April 1987 report "Strikes Under the Railway Labor Act, 1946-1986." 
Other dates are reported in the Wall Street Journal Index for the years 1983, 1984, and 1985. T h e  data on  share 
returns were obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices, University of Chicago. 
During the 100-day interval ( -  180,-81) before the machinists' strike there is a break in Continental's 
return series (of approximately five months) associated with a change in the airline's listing from the New York 
to the American Stock Exchange. Market model parameters are therefore estimated with the most recently 
available 100 days of return data. 
* Significant at the . I 0  level; ** at the .05 level. 
The  effects of a strike on share returns positive cumulative abnormal return over 
need not be confined to the davs sur- the interval (SETTLE, SETTLE + 30).10 
rounding its announcement, but may 
occur over the strike's duration and after 
its settlement. As in Becker and Olson 
(1986), we analyze cumulative abnormal 
returns over the interval beginning 30 
days prior to the announcement of a strike 
and ending 30 days after its settlement, 
CAR(-30, SETTLE + 30). TO focus solely 
on the effects of a strike's duration, we 
analyze CAR(-30, SETTLE- 1). TO iden- 
tify any settlement effects, we analyze 
CAR (SETTLE, SETTLE + 30). For the 
"struck" portfolio, as shown in panel C of 
Table 1, there are no significant CARS 
over any of these intervals. Nonstruck 
airlines, however, experienced a 5.31% 
As noted above, the strikes beginning in 
1983 at Continental are unique because 
they overlap the airline's bankruptcy and 
reorganization. Table 2 shows that the 
announcement in August 1983 of an 
impending machinists' strike, prior to the 
bankruptcy action, had resulted in a 
significant negative abnormal return. Af- 
t& its initial bankruptcy announcement, in 
September 1983, Continental's share value 
rose significantly. The company's share 
value continued to rise during the strike- 
bankruptcy-reorganization e$sode. Sus- 
pension of the strikes, in 1985, had no 
significant i m ~ a c t  on the airline's share 
U 1 
value. Over the entire strike period, 
Continental experienced a cumulative ab- 
normal return of more than 120%. The  
experienced negative abnormal returns relative to strike-bankruptcy events appear to have 
the stock market. T o  account for the possible 
influence of higher oil prices on airlines, we excluded 
' O  T o  check for possible model misspecification, 
the four strikes that during the two-).ear we also conducted CAR tests for the 30-day inter\sals period October 1978-October 1980 and reestimated ( -  90, - 61), and (SETTLE + 31, SETTLE + 60). M'e 
the abnormal returns for the strike intervals for the these CAR tests for estimates in both 
"struck" and "nonstruck" portfolios. Not surpris- the 1963-78 and 1978-86 periods, Significant 
ingly, exclusion of the oil-shock years yielded greater these intervals might suggest benchmark CAR values, but our  basic conclusions regarding the error and not [he true market reaction. all  cases, 
effects of strikes on struck and nonstruck airlines the for these intervals were not significantly 
were not affected. different from zero. 
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resulted in a transfer of wealth from the 
airline's employees to its shareholders.'l 
The  empirical results in Tables 1 and 2 
indicate that, as hypothesized, most airline 
strikes resulted in significant intraindustry 
transfers during the years following de- 
regulation and the elimination of mutual 
aid. Effective strikes resulted in neeative 
U 
abnormal returns for struck airlines and 
positive abnormal returns for nonstruck 
airlines. The ineffective strikes bv Conti- 
nental's employees, however, resulted only 
in a redistribution of wealth from Conti- 
nental's employees to its shareholders. 
The Effects of Strikes on 
Struck and Nonstruck Airlines: 
1963-78 
There are 31 strike events for the 
mutual aid-regulation period. For the 
"struck" portfolio (see Table 3, panel A), 
the onset of a strike resulted only in a 
marginally significant negative cumulative 
abnormal return for the ( -  1, 1) interval. 
In addition, the struck airlines did not 
experience a significantly negative CAR in 
the 30-day o r  60-day prestrike intervals 
(panel C). For the "nonstruck" portfolio a 
significant CAR is not observed for strike 
announcements (Panel B), but a signifi- 
cantly positive cumulative abnormal re- 
turn is observed in the prestrike intervals 
(panel D). 
An analvsis of the strike duration and 
settlement' intervals shows that struck 
MAP members experienced a marginally 
significant negative CAR after strike set- 
tlements. As shown in panel C of Table 3, 
the "struck" portfolio had a 5.32% cumu- 
lative abnormal loss over the (SETTLE, 
SETTLE + 30) interval. Nonstruck MAP 
members, however, experienced signifi- 
cantly positive CARS over the strike 
duration interval and settlement interval 
The short interval results reported in Table 1, 
panel A become insignificantly positive when we 
include the two Continental strike events. This result, 
however, can be attributed to the large abnormal 
return associated with the strike by pilots and flight 
attendants. The nonstruck results in panel B do not 
change significantly. 
Table 3. Strikes and  Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns: The Effects of  Strikes of  Major Air 
Carriers o n  a Portfolio of Struck Airlines and  
a Portfolio of  Nonstruck Airlines, January 
1963-October 1978. 
Z- Value 
(Absolute 
InteruaP Mean (%) Value) 
A: Portfolio of Struck Members 
of the Mutual Atd Pact: 
Strike Announcement Effects (n = 31) 
CAR( - 1,O) - 0.96 1.54 
CAR( - 2.0) - 1.13 1.51 
CAR(0,l) -0.93 1.05 
CAR(- 1 , l )  - 1.32 1.76* 
CAR( - 3,2) - 1.44 1.60 
B: Portfolio of Nonstruck 
Mutual Atd Pact Carriers: 
Strike Announcement Effects (n = 209) 
CAR( - 1,O) 0.04 1.06 
CAR(- 2,O) -0.12 0.97 
CAR(0,l) - 0.07 0.04 
CAR(- 1 , l )  -0.04 0.63 
CAR(- 3,2) -0.31 0.16 
C: Portfolio of Struck Members 
of the Mutual A d  Pact: 
Strike Internal Effects (n  = 31) 
CAR(- 30, - 1) 1.42 0.74 
CAR(-60, - 1) 5.45 1.54 
CAR(- ~ O , S E ~ T L E  - 1) 3.79 1.02 
CAR(SETTLE,SETTLE + 30) - 5.32 1.85* 
CAR( - ~O,SETTLE + 30) - 1.53 0.26 
D: Portfolio of Nonstrutk 
Mutual Aid Pact Carriers: 
Strike lnterual Effects (n = 209)  
CAR(- 30, - 1) 2.44 3.48** 
CAR(-60,- 1) 3.02 3.48** 
CAR( -  SETTLE - 1) 6.77 4.49** 
CAR(SETTLE,SETTLE + 30) 3.52 3.01** 
CAR(- ~O,SETTLE + 30) '10.29 5.09** 
" Day 0, the strike start date, and SETTLE, the 
settlement date, are reported by AIRCon in the April 
1987 report "Strikes Under the Railway Labor Act, 
1946-1986." The data on share returns were 
obtained from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices, University of Chicago. 
* Significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level. 
(panel D). The "nonstruck" portfolio had 
a 10.29% cumulative abnormal gain over 
the (-30, SETTLE + 30) interval, with a 
6.77% cumulative abnormal gain over the 
(-30, SETTLE - 1) interval. 
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Comparing the Stock Market Effects aid payments did not affect the impact of 
of Airline Strikes a strike announcement.'* 
The empirical results suggest that some 
of the effects of airline strikes on share 
returns in the mutual aid-regulation pe- 
riod, 1963-78, differed from those effects 
in the non-mutual aid-deregulation pe- 
riod, 1978-86. This finding may indicate 
that differences between the two periods 
in the industry's operating and labor 
relations environments affected the im- 
pact of strikes. T o  compare the results 
across the two periods, we perform differ- 
ence-in-means t-tests. 
The announcement of a strike benefited 
nonstruck airlines during the 1978-86 
period, but not during the 1963-78 
period (t = 4.17 for the difference in 
CAR ( -  2, 0)). During the later period, the 
impact of the positive "announcement 
effect" appears to have dissipated over the 
course of strikes. In the early period, but 
not in the later period, nonstruck airlines 
gained during strikes (t = 6.82 for 
CAR(- 30, SETTLE - 1) and t = 1.88 for 
CAR(- 30, SETTLE + 30)). We conjecture 
that these results may reflect the influence 
of deregulation: the announcement of a 
strike signaled an opportunity for non- 
struck carriers to gain, but only tempo- 
rarily, as competition among the carriers 
reduced abnormal gains. Regulation, on 
the other hand, may have sheltered 
nonstruck carriers from fare and route 
competition, allowing them to gain as 
strikes continued. Finally, nonstruck air- 
lines gained about equally in both periods 
when strikes were settled (t = 1.60 for 
CAR (SETTLE, SETTLE + 30)). 
In both periods, too, the negative effect 
of strike announcements on struck airlines 
was about the same (t = 1.08 for 
CAR(- 1, l)  and t = 1.26 for CAR(- 1,0), 
suggesting that the availability of mutual 
Conclusion 
This study extends the research on the 
industry-wide impact of strikes by examin- 
ing for the first time the effects of strikes 
on the share values of both struck and 
nonstruck firms in an industry. The 
empirical evidence confirms that effective 
strikes in the airline industry have had 
significant distributive effects, resulting in 
negative abnormal performance for struck 
airlines but positive abnormal perfor- 
mance for nonstruck carriers. The results 
also suggest strongly that the major 
changes that occurred in the industry's 
environment in October 1978-the end of 
mutual aid and of strict regulation- 
significantly altered the impact of a strike. 
We would expect to find similar results 
in other industries in which unions have 
targeted individual firms for strikes while 
rival firms have remained in operation. 
T o  the extent that struck firms are able to 
produce and store output in advance of a 
strike, however-a tactic air carriers obvi- 
ously cannot employ-we might observe 
smaller negative abnormal returns for 
struck firms and smaller positive abnormal 
returns for their nonstruck rivals. An 
examination of strikes in manufacturing 
or mining industries would therefore 
provide a particularly interesting follow- 
up to the present study. 
'' Since the mutual aid years coincide with airline 
regulation whereas the non-mutual aid period 
coincides with deregulation, it is difficult to disentan- 
gle the effects of mutual aid from those of 
regulation. It has been noted by Hirsch (1969) and 
by Karper (1987) that mutual aid has been used in 
other industries, such as newspapers and tires. 
Examination of these other "strike aid" industries 
would provide an opportunity to test more precisely 
for the impact of mutual strike assistance. 
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